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Stanley v. Illinois:
An Introduction to the Rights
of Unwed Fathers
Megan Trivett

The family has long been the basic structure of society.
"The rights to conceive and raise ... children has been deemed
'essential', and among 'the basic civil rights of man"' (Stanley
645). The courts avoid interfering in the rights of raising a
family as much as possible. However, there is a point when the
courts are justified in stepping in. While traditionally only the
rights of the parents have been considered, the rights of the
children have become increasingly important. The practice of
family law in today's society is a constant battle in balancing
the rights and obligations of all members of the family.
"The custody, care and nurture of the child resides first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder (Stanley 645)." Parents are given both responsibilities
and rights concerning their children. While the definition of a
parent may seem obvious in the biological sense, the legal
• definition is more complicated. Prior to the early 1970s, many
states refused to acknowledge families where the parents were
not married. For example, Illinois held that only married
couples would be considered "legal" parents of their children,
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The idea was that when the couple was married, they formed a
"legal" alliance granting them both privileges and
responsibilities. This presented a problem when it came to
illegitimate children. As no legal contract was made, neither
parent had any enforceable "responsibilities" concerning the
child. The child became known as filius nulluis, meaning "child
of no one." In such matters, the state recognized that someone
must be held responsible for the child. The natural mother
gained this legal responsibility. The mother was easier to
identify than the father was, and often the unwed father
showed no concern for the child.
The unwed father was not included in the legal definition
of "parent." However, where the putative father was identified,
he was given responsibilities, but without rights. In the case of
Wallace v Wallace, the court went to the extreme in stating that,
"The father has the duties to his illegitimate child equal to the
duties of a father of a legitimate child, but he has none of the
rights enjoyed by the father of a child born in wedlock (Larson
1036)."

The courts were slowly beginning to realize the
importance for the child to have a relationship with its father.
In the case of Levy, a verdict was reached, stating that "the
obligations and rights of parents ... affords illegitimate children
a right equal with that of legitimate children to require support
by their father (Larsen 1036)." One trial judge in New Jersey
added to this growing belief by saying, "I think it is much better
for the child to have the father ... to infuse into it at an early
age the natural love and affection that it should have for a
parent who is interested in its well-being." Despite the
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increased effort to improve the father-child relationship, unwed
fathers were still denied any rights concerning their children.
The case of Stanley v Illinois was a landmark case for
furthering the rights of unwed fathers. Illinois did not include
unwed fathers in its statutory definition of parents. Thus, if the
mother died, the children became wards of the state as there
was no one with "any legal right or obligation with respect to
the ... children (Brady 159)." Peter Stanley had his children
removed from him under a similar situation. However, the
decision of the United States Supreme Court held the Illinois
statute to be unconstitutional. Stanley v Illinois was the
beginning of a movement to increase the rights of unwed
fathers.
Peter and Joan Stanley had lived together for eighteen
years without being married. During those years, they had
three children. Peter Stanley acknowledged the children to be
his own and helped to support and rase them. When Joan
Stanley died, the Circuit Court of Cook County took the
children into custody (Leibowitz 176). At the dependency
hearing, the trial judge found that Peter Stanley was a "legal
stranger" to the children and thus had no right to a custody
hearing. The children were placed in a court-appointed home.
Stanley immediately petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court.
He challenged the state statute that defined parents, claiming
the statute denied equal protection to unwed fathers.
According to the law, the courts could not take custody of a
child without first holding a neglect hearing to find the parents
unfit. This was standard procedure when it came to a married,
divorced, or adoptive couple. Even the unwed mother had this
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right. However, unwed fathers were denied that hearing.
Stanley believed that by guaranteeing that hearing to everyone
except unwed father, all unwed fathers were being denied equal
protection of the law.
The court rejected Stanley's claim. It found that the fitness
of the unwed father was irrelevant to such cases. In order to
take custody of the children, the state only had to prove that
the dead mother and the living father had never been married.
The court upheld the statute holding that "the distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers was rationally
related to the purposes and policy of the Juvenile Court Act
(Leibowitz 196)." Stanley would not accept this decision. The
United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and
the case was heard on October 19, 1971. One year later, the
Court delivered their 5-2 opinion reversing the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court.
The decision of the Court was explained in a judgement
released on April3, 1972. It was written in three parts. The
first part introduced the main issues, the second discussed due
process, and the third section discussed equal protection. The
decision was followed by a dissenting opinion by two justices.
One of the main questions the Court considered in its
decision was that of the state interest. If the state had a
significant reason for creating the statute, it would have been
allowed to remain intact. (An example of such state interest is
the required age for a person to obtain a driver's license. In this
case, the state interest of safety overrides the individual interest
of driving prior to that age.) According to the Juvenile Court
Act, the state's purpose was to "strengthen the minor's family
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ties whenever possible, removing him from custody ... only
when his welfare or safety ... cannot be adequately safeguarded
without removal" (Stanley 645). The Court found the statute to
be contrary to its own state purpose.
The Supreme Court also took into consideration the
presumptions that the state made concerning unwed fathers.
The state held that a majority of unwed fathers were unfit to
take care of their children and that an even larger number did
not want to be involved with their children. The Supreme
Court answered this assumption by saying, "It may be ... that
most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents ...
But all unwed fathers are not in this category" (645). The
Court continued by stating that while making such an
assumption may have been more efficient, "the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency" (645).
The decision of the Supreme Court was based mainly on
due process. They found that unwed fathers had the right to a
hearing before their children were taken into custody because
the Illinois law gave that right to other parents. The Court
then. answered the question of equal protection based on this
decision of due process. Since the state denied Stanley the right
to a hearing, it had denied him equal protection under the law:
We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law,
Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a
parent before his children were taken from him and
that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all
other parents ... the state denied Stanley the equal
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. (645)
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Did the Court properly consider due process in this case?
Peter Stanley was only claiming his right to equal protection
had been denied, mentioning nothing about due process. The
lower courts did not consider due process in their decisions.
The Supreme Court seemed to justify their use of the due
process clause by noting that the lower courts could have used
it.
The Supreme Court could have ruled in favor of Stanley,
looking at only the equal protection issue. This could be
achieved by finding the "father's interest in the custody of his
children is a fundamental right" outweighed the state interest
(Brysh 303). Considering the classifications of sex and marital
status "suspicious" would also bring about these measures (303).
The decision of the Court to rely on the due process clause
resulted in confusion for lower courts, as the equal protection
section was not thoroughly explained.
Justices White, Brennan, and Stewart agreed with the
decision in its entirety. Justice Douglas joined in parts one and
two. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority opinion.
The disagreement had to do with the way the Court came
to its decision. According to Cardinale v Louisiana, "the Court
cannot pass on a question not raised in the courts below"
(Leibowitz 176). In other words, the question of due process
was not raised in the lower courts and they felt it was improper
for them to consider it. They also believed Illinois had a right
to recognize only those "father-child relationships that arise in
the context of family units bound together by legal obligations
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arising from marriage" (Brady 159). The final dissenting. .
opinion held that there was no reason to find that :he !llm01s
statutory definition of "parents" violated the constltuuonal
right of equal protection.
There are two ways to look at the facts of this case. The
first is in considering the rights and obligations of the parents
while the second deals with those of the child. The different
viewpoints are nearly contrasting in this situation and each deal
with different rights and responsibilities.
.
Several responsibilities must be considered when lookmg at
the parents. The most obvious responsibilities lie ~n .t~~ing care
of the child. However, there are also legal responsibihtles to
consider. In a marriage, a legal contract binds two people to
certain obligations. When parents are married,. it is easier to .
hold them to their responsibilities of their family. However, It
is impractical to require a marriage before the rights and duties
that go with a family can be instituted. Divo:ce and unwed
parents are continually rising. Whil~ our ~oClety would greatly
benefit from families bound by marnage, It would be
impossible to enforce any restrictions trying to. acc~mplish this.
It is also important to look at how these situations affect
the child. It is widely held that children do better in a home
with both parents. The lessons they learn about interacti~g
with people from their parents are invaluabl.e. H~we~er, ~n real
life, an increasing number of children are bemg raised ~n sm~le
parent homes. It is imperative to consider h~w the c~1ld .O:Ight
best be served under these conditions. The nghts of llleg1t1mate
children must remain equal to the rights of legitimate children.
The right to know and associate with both parents is included.

84

Did the Court properly consider due process in this case?
Peter Stanley was only claiming his right to equal protection
had been denied, mentioning nothing about due process. The
lower courts did not consider due process in their decisions.
The Supreme Court seemed to justify their use of the due
process clause by noting that the lower courts could have used
it.
The Supreme Court could have ruled in favor of Stanley,
looking at only the equal protection issue. This could be
achieved by finding the "father's interest in the custody of his
children is a fundamental right" outweighed the state interest
(Brysh 303). Considering the classifications of sex and marital
status "suspicious" would also bring about these measures (303).
The decision of the Court to rely on the due process clause
resulted in confusion for lower courts, as the equal protection
section was not thoroughly explained.
Justices White, Brennan, and Stewart agreed with the
decision in its entirety. Justice Douglas joined in parts one and
two. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority opinion.
The disagreement had to do with the way the Court came
to its decision. According to Cardinale v Louisiana, "the Court
cannot pass on a question not raised in the courts below"
(Leibowitz 176). In other words, the question of due process
was not raised in the lower courts and they felt it was improper
for them to consider it. They also believed Illinois had a right
to recognize only those "father-child relationships that arise in
the context of family units bound together by legal obligations

85

arising from marriage" (Brady 159). The final dissenting. .
opinion held that there was no reason to find that :he !llm01s
statutory definition of "parents" violated the constltuuonal
right of equal protection.
There are two ways to look at the facts of this case. The
first is in considering the rights and obligations of the parents
while the second deals with those of the child. The different
viewpoints are nearly contrasting in this situation and each deal
with different rights and responsibilities.
.
Several responsibilities must be considered when lookmg at
the parents. The most obvious responsibilities lie ~n .t~~ing care
of the child. However, there are also legal responsibihtles to
consider. In a marriage, a legal contract binds two people to
certain obligations. When parents are married,. it is easier to .
hold them to their responsibilities of their family. However, It
is impractical to require a marriage before the rights and duties
that go with a family can be instituted. Divo:ce and unwed
parents are continually rising. Whil~ our ~ociety would greatly
benefit from families bound by marnage, It would be
impossible to enforce any restrictions trying to. acc~mplish this.
It is also important to look at how these situauons affect
the child. It is widely held that children do better in a home
with both parents. The lessons they learn about interacti~g
with people from their parents are invaluabl.e. H~we~er, ~n real
life, an increasing number of children are bemg raised ~n sm~le
parent homes. It is imperative to consider h~w the c~dd .rr.ught
best be served under these conditions. The nghts of lllegltlmate
children must remain equal to the rights of legitimate children.
The right to know and associate with both parents is included.

86

87

"To the illegitimate child, the father is never putative"
(Brady 159). For the sake of the child, the unwed father should
be allowed to gain custody when the mother is not able. Where
the mother has custody of the child, the father should have the
right to be a part of that child's life. The Court made a wise
decision in extending more rights to the unwed fathers.
Stanley v Illinois opened the door to several controversial
issues. It was a landmark case in the rights of the unwed father.
It also brought up issues dealing with sex discrimination and the
place of gender-based role divisions in our society. Most
importantly, however, this case set a precedent to illegitimate
children more rights in associating with their fathers.
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